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Issues and Interpretations

In the early nineteenth century, at least four-ﬁfths of Europeans lived in
small towns and villages or on individual farmsteads, where the majority
engaged, as their ancestors had since Neolithic times, in farming characterized by generally low land and labor productivity. Aristocrats, urban
residents, religious institutions, and others not directly involved in agricultural production owned a great deal of land and received much of the
agrarian surplus. Artisans who worked in their homes or small shops using
hand-powered tools made most manufactured goods. As in the past,
Europeans traded mainly with each other, and they continued to spend
most of their incomes on familiar goods. Protectionist laws, privileged
groups, and poorly developed commercial institutions, communications,
and transport often hobbled the effective operation of factor, commodity,
and product markets.
Yet much had changed signiﬁcantly across the early modern centuries.
Population had risen from a post-Black Death low point of about
60 million around 1400 to more than 200 million in 1820; Britain and
Scandinavia registered four-fold increases (see Appendix A).1 The urbanization level – measured as the proportion of inhabitants living in towns
of more than 10,000 residents – had doubled from some 5 percent in the
ﬁfteenth century to at least 10 percent in 1800. The rate of advance was
greatest in England and Wales, which jumped from 3 percent to 20 percent, and the level highest in the Dutch Republic, which by 1800 boasted
nearly 29 percent city dwellers (see Appendix B).2 Commercial farming
1

2

Lacking proper censuses, all early modern population ﬁgures are estimates; they also often
omit portions of Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and European Russia. See Massimo LiviBacci, A Concise History of World Population, 5th ed. (Chichester, UK, 2012), 25, Table
1.3; Paolo Malanima, Pre-modern European Economy. One Thousand Years (10th–19th
Centuries) (Leiden, 2009), 9, Table 6; Angus Maddison, The World Economy:
A Millennial Perspective (Paris, 2001), 232, Tables B-2 and B-3.
Lowering the urbanization threshold to 5,000 residents yields higher percentages of city
dwellers at both dates (some 15–20 percent around 1800 in Europe as a whole). See
Paolo Malanima, “Italian Cities 1300–1800. A Quantitative Approach,” Rivista di Storia
Economica 14 (1998): 91–126, especially 92 Table 1, and 98 Table 5.
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had become broadly dominant, and new crops, practices, and tenurial
systems had boosted agricultural output and productivity in key regions.
Industries had spread into new areas, and were notably abundant in many
rural districts, as countless farm families spun thread, wove cloth, drew
nails besides raising crops and tending animals; in addition, a large and
growing population had wholly abandoned agricultural for manufacturing
work. Entrepreneurs who bought raw materials, put them out to rural and
urban wage-earners (occasionally assembling them in large workshops or
proto-factories), and sold the ﬁnished goods on markets near and far now
controlled a substantial share of manufacturing throughout Europe, and in
some places predominated. Innovations ranging from navigation instruments and assembly-line shipbuilding to maritime insurance and trading
company organization had helped reduce transaction costs (the various
expenses associated with commercial exchange); new ﬁnancial institutions
and instruments had improved some markets’ efﬁciency. Overseas exploration, colonization, and globalizing commerce had greatly extended merchant networks, introduced unfamiliar consumer goods and raw materials
into Europe, and stimulated the development of novel re-export and
import-substitution industries. Europe’s economic center of gravity, since
antiquity located in the Mediterranean, had shifted to the northwestern
region; according to recent calculations, at least England and the Low
Countries had achieved impressive GDP gains.3 By the end of the period,
factories equipped with new technology were springing up, most thickly in
England, but also on the Continent. Most momentous, as northwestern
Europe had become hegemonic over Europe, its overseas colonies, and its
global commercial networks, capitalism had taken root in northwestern
Europe.
Understanding the causes, nature, extent, and signiﬁcance of these
manifold phenomena has long occupied scholars. In his epochal An
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, published in
1776, Adam Smith (1723–1790) argued that interdependent processes of
market expansion, specialization, and widening divisions of labor were
generating quantitative growth within the “commercial society” of his
time. Due to an innate “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange,” Smith
held, humans engage in commerce to obtain necessary goods and services, and to trade most advantageously they specialize in tasks at which
they excel. The resulting divisions of labor had upgraded skills and
increased wealth, stimulating innovation that raised productivity,
3

For estimates, see Angus Maddison, Contours of the World Economy 1–2030 AD: Essays in
Macro-Economic History (Oxford, 2007), 382, Table A.7; Luciano Pezzolo, “The Via
Italiana to Capitalism,” in The Cambridge History of Capitalism, eds. Larry Neal and
Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2 vols. (Cambridge, UK, 2014), I: 269, Table 10.1.
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lowered prices, and unleashed growth. Public authorities and private
bodies had repeatedly intervened to shape economic activity to their
advantage through regulations, monopolies, tariffs, and the like, but
their main accomplishment, in Smith’s view, had been to divert land,
labor, and capital from their most productive uses, constraining improvement. To promote the true wealth of nations – the full development of
agriculture, industry, and commerce – individual initiative, competition,
and free trade had to ﬂourish. Enabling them, Smith and his fellow
“political economists” insisted, liberated inherent human qualities within
a self-regulating natural order, an “invisible hand” that through market
transactions begot the common good from individuals’ admittedly clashing “self-love” (self-interest).4
Smith did not propose that European economies had embarked on
a process of unending growth. The complication was not simply obstructive pressure groups and institutions: rather, despite specialization and
division of labor, over time economies experience diminishing returns
(when additional inputs yield progressively smaller increments to output), halting advance. An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) by
Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834), built on the kinds of empirical
data that practitioners of “political arithmetic” (the application of statistics to policymaking) had been systematically gathering since the late
seventeenth century, evaluated early modern economic outcomes yet
more somberly. Periods of expanding output and rising standards of
living had occurred, Malthus acknowledged. But that was not a boon.
The demographic growth that inevitably ensued sabotaged these achievements, as technological limitations and a ﬁxed land area prevented agricultural output from matching population increase. The subsistence
crises that had invariably eventuated had only been resolved by what
Malthus termed “positive” population checks (famine, disease, war)
or – less often – “preventive” checks such as delayed marriage or sexual
abstinence. In either case, the result was demographic decline to the point
where a new cycle could begin – but only to repeat the same predetermined pattern.
Malthusian views long dominated interpretations of early modern
European economies. Despite recurrent periods of improvement, demographic, institutional, behavioral, and technological features internal (or
“endogenous”) to the economy sooner or later frustrated sustained
growth, resulting in long-term immobility or at best minimal and fragile
advance. A powerful external (“exogenous”) force – in most accounts,
4

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (New York,
1937), 13, 423, 14.
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breakthrough technology – had therefore been necessary to usher in
ongoing growth, improvements in standards of living, and changes in
behavioral practices and economic structure alike.5 More recently, however, scholarship grounded in fresh quantitative analyses and a Smithian
emphasis on the knock-on beneﬁts of market enlargement has challenged
the stagnationist orthodoxy. Without denying that serious downturns and
setbacks occurred, this revisionist historiography maintains that by
exploiting a combination of existing and new practices, techniques, and
organizational forms, northwestern Europe in particular achieved signiﬁcant growth, which over time sparked the innovations that set off continuous development.
To Karl Marx (1818–1883), on the contrary, it was profound structural transformation, the establishment of a wholly novel form or “mode”
of production subsequently dubbed capitalism, that induced the new and
more productive divisions of labor, specializations, and technologies
necessary for sustained growth.6 In Marx’s deﬁnition, capitalism is an
order of structured inequality between wage-earners who lack productive
property and capitalists who control such resources. To earn their subsistence, workers must sell their labor – or, more precisely, the productive
power embodied in it. The capitalists who purchase labor power earn
proﬁts (in Marxist terminology, extract surplus value) by selling the goods
made with it for more than their total production costs. To maintain their
proﬁts in competitive markets, all capitalists constantly seek to reduce the
cost of their inputs, wages most of all, by investing in innovation. Thus
the technological and/or organizational prerequisites for growth were the
outcome rather than the cause of the capitalist system.
The genesis of capitalism lay in the process that Marx called “original”
or “primitive” accumulation. At once destructive and creative, original
accumulation was an economic, social, political, and cultural phenomenon that encompassed town and country, industry and agriculture,
expropriation and concentration of capital assets. For capitalism to
arise, Marx asserted, capital – both in the form of land and equipment,
and in the form of specie and credit – had to be amassed by individuals
who invested it productively rather than consuming it. This process
involved dispossessing peasants from their holdings, crushing autonomous artisans and guilds, and engaging in slaving, colonial exploitation,
and usury. Government laws, monopolies, taxes, and debt promoted
5
6

This type of growth is often termed “Schumpeterian” after the theorist of innovation
Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950).
The term “capitalism” is a mid-nineteenth-century neologism, but analyses of the system
it characterizes and of “capital” as a distinctive entity had been taking shape across the
early modern period.
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these undertakings and supported the system thereafter; far from being
a brake on or enemy of economic change, the state was one of its principal
progenitors and servants. These initiatives took time to come to fruition
and often eventuated in transitional forms of production. Still, Marx
maintained, across the early modern centuries original accumulation
gave birth to European capitalism.
Later scholars have sought to ﬂesh out Marx’s sketchy historical
account of capitalism’s origins. The “world-system” approach, represented most prominently by the work of Immanuel Wallerstein, derives
in part from Marx’s postulate that capital derived from commercial
exploitation of colonial possessions was both a prime solvent of
Europe’s prior feudal order and a source of funds to ﬁnance its successor.
It also ampliﬁes Smith’s argument that the growth of trade furthers the
division of labor, combining this with theories holding that capitalist
development in favored areas necessarily bred underdevelopment elsewhere. According to Wallerstein, capitalism in western Europe (the
“core” of a new world economy) was built on the exploitation of other
regions, notably eastern Europe and the colonized New World (the
“periphery”). Together with an intermediate “semi-periphery,” these
regions were assembled into a global economic order characterized by
a uniﬁed market but sharply hierarchic forms of production, labor
regimes, and polities: capital-intensive agriculture and industry,
a predominantly free and skilled workforce, and strong states in the
core, labor-intensive production, mainly coerced (enslaved and enserfed)
and less skilled workers, and feeble states in the periphery, intermediate
forms in the semi-periphery. Unequal exchange of more proﬁtable
European items for less lucrative colonial goods, backed up by similarly
unbalanced power relations, transferred surplus capital from the periphery to the core where it built sustained development simultaneously with
minimal growth in the semi-periphery and outright backwardness in the
periphery. Though subsequently the world-system incorporated additional areas and states shifted position within and between zones, before
the mid-seventeenth century a Europe-based capitalist economy with
a global reach was ﬁrmly in place.
Issuing from Marx’s insistence on the importance of peasant dispossession, analyses by Robert Brenner and his followers locate the principal
early modern economic dynamic in class structure and attendant class
struggle in the countryside. In particular, they emphasize social relations
between lords and peasants founded on asymmetrical property ownership
and expressed in peaceful and violent interactions mediated, in a variety
of fashions, by state institutions and policies. The different outcomes of
this interplay, they maintain, accounted on the one hand for divergent
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patterns and levels of growth both within the western European core and
between western and eastern Europe, and on the other for the eventual
advent (or frustration) of agrarian capitalism, “the indispensable foundation” for industrialization and subsequent “ongoing economic
development.”7 In contrast to world-system theory, which contends
that capitalism issued from the resources and structures provided by
Europe’s global commerce, Brennerian approaches situate its mainsprings within Europe, notably rural England and the Netherlands.
This book draws on and evaluates these interpretations; deploys theoretical insights and empirical data from disciplines including cultural
anthropology, sociology, women’s and gender history, slavery studies,
and consumption and material culture research; and examines global
inﬂuences on early modern Europe’s economic development. It maintains that
–early modern Europe was characterized by a variety of non-hegemonic,
contemporaneous economic arrangements including peasant farming, demesne
lordship, artisanal handicrafts, manufacturing in urban and – most of all – rural
households – all, across the eighteenth century, increasingly dominated by merchant capital and control;
–these formations achieved growth, albeit uneven and discontinuous over time
and space, by more thoroughly exploiting locally adapted best practices and
techniques; product, process, and organizational innovation; creation and incorporation through overseas trade and colonization of critical new resource supplies, ﬁnished goods, and consumer markets;
–though wage labor, market orientation, secure private property, and entrepreneurial activity were to be found in these formations, and in them new ﬁnancial
instruments and institutions emerged, domestic and overseas trade expanded,
and technical and organizational change occurred, they did not represent quasi-,
proto-, or incomplete capitalism but were organized according to their own logics,
dynamics, and purposes;
–capitalism was the unforeseen outcome of crisis in the cottons industry in
the second half of the eighteenth century rooted in Europe’s globalizing commerce and consumption that was resolved by technological innovation that crystallized elements of preceding formations into a novel conﬁguration, dynamic,
and logic of production.

The multifarious nature of early modern economies and the many
debates and research their history has stimulated have determined the
scope, subject matter, and shape of this book. Chapter 2 sketches common and distinctive features of European economies in the ﬁfteenth
century. Its anatomy of European economies at the dawn of Europe’s
early modern overseas exploration, colonization, and commercial
7

Robert Brenner, “Property and Progress: Where Adam Smith Went Wrong,” Marxist
History-Writing for the 21st Century, ed. Chris Wickham (Oxford, 2007), 109, 107.
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expansion identiﬁes inﬂuences that molded subsequent developments,
examined in the next six chapters. During what is often labeled “the long
sixteenth century” (1450/70–1620/50), the subject of Part II, trade,
migration, and commodity ﬂows initiated and directed by Portugal and
Spain interacted with discrepant agricultural and industrial trends to alter
economic conditions within and among European states and regions as
well as abroad. Crisis during the seventeenth century interrupted some of
the impressive growth and stirrings of structural change that had characterized the previous period. The period also saw signiﬁcant shifts in
economic primacy, the brief but splendid Dutch cultural and economic
“Golden Age,” and the ﬁrst stages of renewed expansion.
These developments bore fruit in the eighteenth century. Part III
examines the multiple global and domestic forces that refashioned commerce, agriculture, and industry, and by disproportionately advantaging
northwestern Europe enabled capitalism to achieve hegemony there.
They also consolidated regional economic disparities, lately dubbed
a “little divergence” as contrasted to the “Great Divergence” that the
Industrial Revolution purportedly opened between Europe and Asia. The
Conclusion reviews the opportunities and constraints that shaped early
modern Europe’s diverse economic formations, the birth of the system
that superseded them, and interpretations that help make sense of these
phenomena.
Whereas short series of data are exhibited in tables within individual
chapters, the appendices should be consulted for data that are cited
throughout the book: Appendix A – European population grouped
nationally and regionally; Appendix B – European urbanization percentages by nation and region; Appendix C.1 – trans-Atlantic shipments of
enslaved Africans by 25-year period and annual average; Appendix C.2 –
European and American shippers of enslaved Africans by ﬂag of ship; and
Appendix C.3 – regional disembarkations of enslaved Africans throughout the Atlantic basin.
To reveal both the general patterns of early modern Europe’s economic
history and its discrete shapes and tempos, this book is geographically,
chronologically, and topically expansive. It ranges from East India
Company trading networks in Southeast Asia to slaving stations on the
Atlantic coast of Africa, from Mediterranean latifundia to minuscule
market gardens in Flanders, from European industrial zones to New
World plantations. In addition to the increasingly similar and interconnected ways by which crops were cultivated, animals bred, raw materials
obtained, goods manufactured and exchanged, Transitions explores features speciﬁc to disparate places and institutions. Each of these arrangements implied a characteristic set of economic and social relations, so the
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book introduces wage-earners and entrepreneurs, artisans and merchants, slaves and masters, serfs and lords.
To examine the rise of capitalism is to investigate the origins of the
economic order that at present dominates Europe and the world. But it is
also to court epistemological danger. Knowing how the story has “come
out” so far can all too easily lead into a teleological and deterministic
account of the origins of that result. This is not an easy problem to avoid
in early modern economic history, because the very phrase “early modern” implies movement toward the present. Similarly, “transition”
acquires its logic retrospectively, from the vantage point of capitalist
hegemony, while terms like “pre-capitalist,” “pre-industrial,” and
“proto-industrial” can imply partial or defective versions of subsequently
dominant systems.
This book does not entirely avoid the trap of teleology; present concerns
inevitably – and appropriately – suggest questions about the past and ways
of answering them. Transitions does, however, seek to understand the
operation of early modern economies in their own terms, rather than
insinuate that they obeyed ﬂawed logics so that the ascendancy of capitalism was ineluctable. By attending to a broad range of regions, structures,
sectors, and patterns of change and continuity between the mid-ﬁfteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, it attempts to recapture the diversity and
contingency of economic development during that momentous period.

Suggested Reading
Book III is the most explicitly historical section of Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (many modern editions), while
Chapters I–III of Book I discuss the division of labor in a context of expanding
markets. The several editions of Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the
Principle of Population have also been frequently reprinted; some editions include
sources and commentaries. For a brief survey of the thought of these and other
early analysts, along with a useful bibliography, see José Luís Cardoso, “The
Political Economy of Rising Capitalism,” in The Cambridge History of Capitalism,
eds. Larry Neal and Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2 vols. (Cambridge, UK, 2014), I:
574–99. In their bulk, the three volumes of Karl Marx, Capital, A Critique of
Political Economy (originally published 1867–1894; many English translations and
editions) can be intimidating. For historical materials, see especially volume I,
Chapters 14, 26–32, and volume III, Chapter 20. Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist
Economic Formations, ed. E. J. Hobsbawm (New York, 1965), provides a superb
introduction to Marx’s thinking. The earlier Marxist-inspired transition debate
can best be followed in Paul M. Sweezy, The Transition from Feudalism to
Capitalism (London, 1976); S. R. Epstein, “Rodney Hilton, Marxism and the
Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism,” Past and Present Supplement 2 (2007):
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248–69, is a recent evaluation; for an update, Shami Ghosh, “Rural Economies
and Transitions to Capitalism: Germany and England Compared (c. 1200–c.
1800),” Journal of Agrarian Change 16/2 (2016): 255–90. For
Immanuel Wallerstein’s work, see his The Modern World-System, 4 vols.
(New York, 1974–1989; Berkeley, 2011). The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class
Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, eds. T. H. Aston
and C. H. E. Philpin (Cambridge, UK, 1985), includes Brenner’s work and
commentaries by other scholars. Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism:
A Longer View (London and New York, 2002), ably synthesizes Marxist scholarship arguing that agrarian capitalism caused English industrialization.
Recent essays that emphasize the cyclical nature of early modern economies
requiring an exogenous shock to set off ongoing growth include
George Grantham, “Contra Ricardo: On the Macroeconomics of Pre-industrial
Economies,” European Review of Economic History 3 (1999): 199–232; Jack
A. Goldstone, “Efﬂorescences and Economic Growth in World History:
Rethinking the ‘Rise of the West’ and the Industrial Revolution,” Journal of
World History 13 (2002): 323–89. For more extended presentations that cover
longer time spans, see Gregory Clark, A Farewell to Alms. A Brief Economic History
of the World (Princeton, 2007), and J. L. Luiten van Zanden, The Long Road to the
Industrial Revolution. The European Economy in a Global Perspective, 1000–1800
(Leiden, 2009). Bas van Bavel, The Invisible Hand? How Market Economies Have
Emerged and Declined Since AD 500 (Oxford, 2016), maintains that markets
inevitably self-destruct; Ronald Findlay and Kevin O’Rourke, Power and Plenty:
Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium (Princeton, 2007),
attribute responsibility for long-term cycles of growth and contraction to the
interplay of war and international trade. For interpretations arguing that primarily
endogenous forces slowly accumulated, eventually causing qualitative change, see
Jan de Vries, “Economic Growth Before and After the Industrial Revolution.
A Modest Proposal,” in Early Modern Capitalism: Economic and Social Change in
Europe 1400–1800, ed. Maarten Prak (London, 2001), 175–92; and Regina Grafe,
“Economic and Social Trends,” in The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern
European History, 1350–1750, ed. Hamish Scott, 2 vols. (Oxford, 2015), I:
269–94. Francesco Boldizzoni, The Poverty of Clio (Princeton, 2011), is
a sustained critique of dominant quantitative approaches and economic theories
that currently inform many explanations of early modern economic history;
Jürgen Kocka, Capitalism. A Short History (Princeton, 2016), gives a very brief
introduction to concepts and scholarship covering the title subject up to the
present day.
Notable broader works that amply repay further study, are Fernand Braudel,
Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Centuries, 3 vols. (1979; New York, 1981–
1984); The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, eds. Stephen Broadberry and
Kevin H. O’Rourke, vol. I (Cambridge, UK, 2010). The Cambridge History of
Capitalism, vol. I, reveals the wide variety of deﬁnitions of capitalism and
approaches to its history, though it is disappointingly incomplete on medieval
and early modern Europe. The Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History, ed.
Joel Mokyr, 5 vols. (Oxford, 2003), contains ﬁne short introductions to many
subjects explored in this book, though some entries are becoming dated. In
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economic history as in economics in general, much of the path-breaking scholarship appears in journals. Some, like Economic History Review, Explorations in
Economic History, Journal of Economic History, and European Review of Economic
History, include a broad range of topics and eras; others, like Textile History and
Agricultural History Review, specialize in particular sectors. An increasing number
of national and regional periodicals, such as Rivista di storia economica, Histoire,
Économie & Société, Low Countries Journal of Social and Economic History,
Scandinavian Economic History Review, and Revista de Historia Económica-Journal
of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, are published wholly or in part in
English. More general scholarly journals such as Past and Present, Journal of
Interdisciplinary History, and Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales (English edition)
also regularly publish important articles on early modern European economies.
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